What to Take Away from Sellars’s Kantian Naturalism by O'Shea, James
 1 
 
 
What to Take Away from Sellars’s Kantian Naturalism 
 
James R. O’Shea, University College Dublin 
 
 
(This is the author’s post-peer reviewed version.  For citations, please refer to the 
published version in: James R. O’Shea, ed., Sellars and His Legacy, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2016, pp. 130–148.) 
 
 
ABSTRACT:  I contend that Sellars defends a uniquely Kantian naturalist outlook both in general 
and more particularly in relation to the nature and status of what he calls ‘epistemic principles’; and 
I attempt to show that this remains a plausible and distinctive position even when detached from 
Sellars’s quasi-Kantian transcendental idealist contention that the perceptible objects of the manifest 
image strictly speaking do not exist, i.e., as conceived within that common sense framework.  I first 
explain the complex Kant-inspired sense in which Sellars did not take the latter thesis concerning 
the objects of the manifest image to apply, at least in certain fundamental respects, to persons.  In 
this primary Kantian sense, I suggest, persons as thinkers and agents exist univocally across both 
the manifest and scientific images, and this in principle would enable an integration of persons 
within a multi-leveled naturalistic ontology, one that is independent of Sellars’s quasi-Kantian 
transcendental idealist thesis.  Finally, I examine in some detail how this defensible blend of 
Kantian and naturalist themes turns out to be what is fundamental in Sellars’s complex and 
controversial views on the nature and status of epistemic principles. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
 I contend that there is a distinctive and defensible Kantian naturalist line of thinking running 
throughout Sellars’s philosophy that remains highly promising despite (a) its having been 
overshadowed by certain stronger, more disputable contentions with which it was essentially 
connected in Sellars’s thought, and (b) its having been largely lost in the legacy that has 
subsequently divided so-called ‘left wing’ (Hegelian, pragmatist, Wittgensteinian) Sellarsians from 
‘right wing’ scientific naturalist Sellarsians.1  The central and itself controversial line of thought is 
that fundamentally Kantian conceptions of our cognition and agency can be integrated successfully 
with certain scientific naturalist philosophical outlooks that are usually taken to be incompatible 
with those Kantian views.  Here I will focus on what Sellars called epistemic principles.  In what 
follows I first attempt to detach Sellars’s subtle Kantian naturalism from the most well-known, 
quasi-Kantian banner under which Sellars himself flew it: namely, his contention that, all things 
considered and strictly speaking, the object-ontology2 of “the common sense framework” – that 
 
1 See the Introduction to this volume for the background context of Sellars’s diverse legacy. 
 
2 As we shall see below, there turns out to be an important sense in which for Sellars, as for Kant, persons 
are in certain crucial respects not ‘objects’ in such a way as to render them candidates for replacement by 
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is, the “manifest image” conception of perceptible, colored physical objects – “is transcendentally 
ideal, i.e. that there really are no such things as the objects of which it speaks” (SM V, §95; italics added).   
 
 Of course in another sense, on Sellars’s view, the perceptible objects of the manifest image 
do really exist: namely, as they are or will be analogically reconceived in their more adequate 
scientific successor concepts (cf. SM V).  There are many other points that could and should be 
made about the complex relationships between the manifest and scientific images, on Sellars’s 
view, that would lessen the initial shock to common sense of his striking contention concerning 
the ultimate replacement of the object-ontology of the manifest image.  But this is not my aim on 
the present occasion, which is rather to display the largely overlooked plausibility of Sellars’s 
innovative Kantian naturalist outlook, as I characterize it, even when this is detached from the more 
controversial quasi-Kantian contention that strictly speaking – and about this ‘strict’ sense much 
more would need to be said3 – “there are no such things as the colored physical objects of the 
common-sense world” (EPM IX, §41).   
 
  I call the latter striking contention ‘quasi-Kantian’ in part for the obvious reason that 
Sellars’s own proposal, in effect, was to replace Kant’s thinkable but unknowable ‘things in 
themselves’ or ‘noumena’ with the postulated and (at the manifest level) imperceptible yet 
eminently knowable objects of ongoing scientific theorizing.  In addition to this there are also 
longstanding controversies concerning the nature of Kant’s transcendental idealism itself, and 
while in my own work on Kant’s philosophy I am heavily influenced by the interpretations of Kant 
defended by Sellars and by his student (and my teacher) Jay Rosenberg, on the specific interpretive 
question of Kant’s own understanding of our inevitable and ‘problematic’ thought of the existence 
of so-called ‘things in themselves’ I am inclined toward the more deflationary, epistemic readings 
of this aspect of Kant’s thought (though I shall not engage that interpretive controversy on this 
occasion).4  For my present purposes, I will begin with a closer look at Sellars’s striking ontological 
 
more adequate scientific successor conceptions of their nature.  This is compatible with there also being 
many other aspects of persons and their bodies that are subject to such explanatory reconceptions in the 
ongoing development of the scientific image. 
 
3 I examine Sellars’s complex views on conceptual change and replacement ontologies in relation to his 
envisioned final synoptic “fusion” of the manifest and scientific images of “man-in-the-world,” in chapters 
6 and 7 of my Wilfrid Sellars: Naturalism with a Normative Turn (2007).  A first pass at some of the topics 
discussed in this chapter may be found in O’Shea (2011), which was my reply to some helpful objections 
to my reading of Sellars offered by William Rottschaefer in the same journal issue (along with his further 
reply). 
4 For an extended defense of Sellars’s interpretation and development of Kant’s transcendental idealism, 
see Sicha 2002, in Sellars (KTM).  For my own interpretation of Kant’s views, see O’Shea (2012a), Kant’s 
Critique of Pure Reason: An Introduction and Interpretation.  (On the role of ‘things in themselves’ in particular, 
see the various references in the index of that work under ‘idealism: transcendental’.)  For Jay Rosenberg’s 
outstanding and thoroughly Sellarsian introduction to Kant’s first Critique, see Rosenberg 2005.  Where I 
differ from Rosenberg primarily concerns what is, in effect, his attribution to Kant (2005: 79–81) of Sellars’s 
analogical theory of sense impressions, where this is understood as a theory of the ultimate counterparts, 
obtaining among ‘things as they are in themselves’, to the phenomenal spatiotemporal relations among 
objects that we cognize in experience.  Sellars was generally circumspect about attributing these particular 
Sellarsian views to Kant himself, holding rather that this is what Kant ought to have thought given the full 
implications of his view (cf. Sellars SM, chapters 1–2; and KTE, the first footnote, on “Kant’s treatment of 
sensation” as “notoriously inadequate and inept”).  But the overall strongly ontological interpretation of 
Kant’s ‘things in themselves’ is shared by Rosenberg and Sellars.  My 2012 book inclines toward well-known 
alternative, non-traditional readings of Kant’s transcendental idealism, but is otherwise compatible with 
Sellars’s insightful accounts of Kant’s conceptions of cognition and agency.  See also David Landy (2015) 
for a very interesting Sellarsian reading of Kant on the analogical role of non-conceptual sensations in 
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contention and its relationship to his reading of Kant.  This will then pave the way for an 
examination of those genuinely Kantian yet also consistently naturalistic aspects of Sellars’s 
thoughts about the structure of human knowledge that I want to highlight and defend here. 
 
 Overall, then, I will argue that in a primary Kantian sense persons as thinkers and agents 
exist univocally across both the manifest and scientific images, and that this in principle would 
enable an integration of persons within a multi-leveled naturalistic ontology that is independent of 
Sellars’s quasi-Kantian transcendental idealist thesis that the objects of the manifest image do not 
exist per se.  Finally, I examine how this defensible blend of Kantian and naturalist themes turns 
out to be what is really fundamental in Sellars’s view of the nature and status of epistemic principles 
in general. 
 
 
2.  Sellars’s Quasi-Kantian Transcendental Idealism:  Color, Ultimate Homogeneity, and 
Relocation 
 
 
 Readers of Kant and Sellars sometimes overlook the fact that in chapter two of Science and 
Metaphysics Sellars rejected Kant’s own arguments for transcendental idealism as fallacious, both with 
respect to space and time and in relation to the categories (SM II, §§58–78).  Sellars’s own proposal 
is the following:  
 
 
Kant…failed to notice a further line of argument for the transcendental ideality of 
perceptible things which really works, and is the one I shall espouse.  [Footnote:] I shall 
tip my hand by saying that the true ground for the transcendental ideality of the perceptual 
world lies in the distinction between perceptible physical objects and the objects of 
theoretical science, a distinction which was blurred by Kant. (SM II, §69) 
 
The feature of perceptible physical objects upon which Sellars proceeds to focus in this context is 
their color, the discussion of which he sums up as follows:  
 
Thus Kant should have recognized that colour…is as essential a feature of the objects of 
outer intuition as is shape.  If, therefore, a sound case can be made for the idea that the 
colours we conceptually represent in perception are transcendentally ideal, i.e. exist only as 
conceptually represented, then it would follow that the world of perceived objects is, after 
all, in the Kantian sense, ‘appearance’.  [Footnote:]  Notice that this is, of course, 
compatible with the idea that certain counterpart attributes, conceived by analogy with 
them, are transcendentally real, though, perhaps, only as in some sense states of the 
perceiver.  (SM II, §75)  
 
We need not rehearse here Sellars’s various arguments in relation to the supposed ‘ultimate 
homogeneity’ of perceived expanses of color in contrast (initially) to the particulate objects of the 
emerging scientific image, and his further contention that this necessitates the reconception and 
ontological ‘relocation’ (so to speak) of homogeneous color contents from being sensible qualities 
of physical objects to being states of perceivers, followed by further such explanatory 
reconceptions in line with Sellars’s projected ‘pure process’ ontology.5  But broadly speaking, as 
 
cognition, but interpreted by Landy as a view within Kant’s empirical realism rather than (as in Sellars) 
concerning ‘things in themselves’. 
5 One locus classicus for these topics is Sellars, see PSIM V–VI; another is FMPP, passim.  A thoroughgoing 
and richly suggestive defense of Sellars’s views on these topics may be found in Seibt, chapter 9 of this 
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indicated in the passage above, Sellars on these grounds held that a proper respect for Berkeley’s 
insight concerning the inseparability of perceived color and shape, among other considerations, 
ultimately entails the striking contention above concerning the ultimate falsity, strictly speaking, of 
the common sense framework of perceptible physical objects.   It is this quasi-Kantian replacement 
for Kant’s transcendental idealism that for present purposes I want to detach from certain other 
deeply Kantian views in Sellars that I suggest can survive the excision.    
 
 I need to make two further important observations about Sellars’s quasi-Kantian über-
contention before moving beyond it for present purposes.   
 
 First, when Sellars indicates that he regards the objects of the manifest image to be 
‘transcendentally ideal’ or ‘phenomenal’ or ‘appearances’, in his (and allegedly Kant’s) sense that 
strictly speaking such objects do not exist per se, he means carefully to distinguish this from any 
claim about persons and norms, along with the attendant dimensions of meaning, truth, and 
intentionality that the latter entail.  For Sellars argues that persons and norms as conceived within 
the manifest image can be integrated successfully in one “stereoscopic” and “synoptic vision” with 
the ideal scientific ontology that he argues must replace the perceptible objects of the framework 
of common sense (cf. PSIM VI–VII).  My suggestion is that the modified Kantian arguments that 
Sellars puts forward in this connection can be combined with various naturalistic hypotheses in 
Sellars, often taken to be incompatible with them, that do not require Sellars’s further striking 
contention that the perceptible objects of common sense do not strictly speaking exist.  The 
remaining ‘Kantian naturalist’ outlook, whatever its ultimate merits, was a distinctive twentieth 
century philosophical contribution from Sellars – one which, even when detached from the more 
striking but widely rejected quasi-Kantian framework in which Sellars embedded it, represented a 
unique combination of philosophical aspirations that should distinguish it from the valuable 
contributions of other ‘analytic Kantians’ who have subsequently followed in the wake of the later 
Wittgenstein and P. F. Strawson. 
 
 Second, there is nothing in the rejection of Sellars’s arguments for his über-contention 
concerning the object-ontology of the common sense framework that requires us also to reject 
scientific realism with respect to unobservable theoretical objects, in contrast with instrumentalist or 
constructive empiricist views, etc., in the philosophy of science.   Scientific realism in this basic 
sense is now widely accepted, in part due to Sellars’s own important mid-century criticisms of 
instrumentalist conceptions of the nature of scientific explanation.  For my purposes what would 
have to be argued against in relation to Sellars’s wider views on this matter is the alleged 
incompatibility of that scientific realist outlook with the ‘manifest’ ontology of colored physical 
objects.  The falsity of that incompatibility claim will be presupposed rather than argued for here, 
despite its admittedly central role in Sellars’s philosophy.  The question of just which aspects of 
Sellars’s complex views on the nature of sense perception and sensory consciousness can and 
should survive the rejection of the particular arguments concerning sensible qualities that service 
Sellars’s incompatibility claim is an important one that I have investigated elsewhere (O’Shea 2010; 
see also David Rosenthal, chapter 8 this volume).   
 
 
3.  Sellars and Kant on Knowledge, Nature, and the Thinking Self 
 
 
volume.  For a systematic and plausible defense of key aspects of Sellars’s views on sensory consciousness 
that nonetheless diagnoses and rejects the ‘relocation’ story, see Rosenthal, chapter 8 of this volume; and 
also along these general lines see the in-depth defence of a Sellarsian critical realist theory of sense 
perception in Coates (2007).  The relationships between Sellars’s and Kant’s views on sensibility and 
perceptual cognition are also explored in some depth, and with insight, in Haag 2012. 
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 It is clear from his ‘Autobiographical Reflections’ that Sellars viewed his own philosophical 
development from very early on as an evolving attempt to harmonize two deeply held 
philosophical convictions (cf. the Introduction to this volume).  The first was that Kant was in 
certain crucial respects fundamentally correct about the a priori necessary structure of human 
knowledge and rational agency.  This first conviction would later find one expression in Sellars’s 
famous remark in ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind’ that “in characterizing an episode or 
a state as that of knowing, we are not giving an empirical description of that episode or state; we are 
placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says” 
(EPM VIII, §36).  The second enduring conviction, however, was that this Kantian normative 
structure would itself somehow have to be fully explainable in principle within a comprehensively 
scientific naturalist ontology.  Sellars reassured the logical empiricist Herbert Feigl in the 1930’s, 
for example, that they “shared a common purpose: to formulate a scientifically oriented, 
naturalistic realism which would ‘save the appearances’,” in relation to which Sellars further 
clarified that for him, although not for Feigl, the “aim was to map these structures” – that is, “such 
ideas as causal necessity, synthetic a priori knowledge, intentionality, ethical intuitionism, the 
problem of universals, etc.” – “into a naturalistic, even a materialistic, metaphysics” (AR 290).  
What Sellars then proceeded to argue throughout his career, not without some historical irony, is 
that it is the essential truth of Kant’s views concerning the a priori conceptual structure of our 
thought and experience that in fact provides the only satisfactory way for us to go beyond Kant 
and successfully envision the standpoint of a fully comprehensive or ‘synoptic’ naturalism.   
 
 As noted in the Introduction, it is this enduring twofold project of Sellars’s – that of 
defending a Kantian conception of our conceptual cognition, and yet at the same time attempting 
to sketch how to naturalize that same conception – that I think has been the primary source of the 
subsequent forks in the road that have been carved out by those who have been strongly influenced 
by Sellars’s work.  My concern here is not with either the nature or the genesis of the distinction 
between the subsequent ‘left wing’ Sellarsians who emphasize the irreducibly normative Kantian 
aspects of Sellars’s view, and the ‘right wing’ Sellarsians who seek to realize Sellars’s ambitiously 
naturalistic aims, but rather to explore some of the ways in which Sellars thought it might make 
sense to be both a Kantian and a naturalist about the structure of our knowledge.  I believe that 
the fulcrum of Sellars’s simultaneously Kantian yet naturalist conception of our knowledge is his 
self-consciously Kantian conception of the nature of the human knower or thinker, although this 
topic is not typically explored in discussions of Sellars’s epistemology and metaphysics.   
 
 Sellars argued that there are insights in Kant’s conception of the thinking self that make 
possible a stronger integration of Kantian views with a naturalistic ontology than Kant himself was 
either willing or able to attempt.  Furthermore, and most usefully for my purposes, Sellars 
maintained that this particular integration holds across both the Aristotelian/Strawsonian ontology 
of persons and their bodies that characterizes Sellars’s manifest image ontology (the “common-
sense framework”) and in the case of the revisionary object-ontology of Sellars’s envisioned 
scientific image according to which, in the end, a “person would be a bundle of absolute processes” 
(FMPP III, §125).  The place where Sellars sketched this view most helpfully was in his 1970 APA 
Presidential Address, entitled “…This I or He or It (the Thing) Which Thinks…” (‘I’; see also his 
‘Metaphysics and the Concept of a Person’ (MP)). 
 
 “In the manifest image,” Sellars holds, “our concept of a person” is “that of a system of 
capacities pertaining to the various modes of thinking” (MP V, §57), where such ‘modes of 
thinking’ on Sellars’s account include our perceptions and volitions, too.  While we cannot explore 
the details of this account here, in ‘This I...’ Sellars offers an interpretation of Kant on the unity of 
apperception that begins with  
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an unrestricted principle in the philosophy of mind, which transcends the distinction 
between the noumenal and the phenomenal self, to the effect that 
 
  an I thinks of a manifold 
 
is not to be confused with 
 
 an I has a manifold of thoughts. (‘I’ §7) 
 
Furthermore, the “ways in which many thinkings constitute one thinking are the ‘forms of 
thought’, e.g. the categories” (‘I’ §8).  This unrestricted principle concerning the conceived unity 
of the thinker and a correlative unity in the form of its thinkable thoughts is then argued by Sellars 
(interpreting Kant) to entail the more specific, holistic  
 
epistemic principle that any true content of thought, e.g., that Socrates is wise, must, in 
principle, be an element in a certain kind of larger context, e.g., 
 
 an I thinks the true thought of a world in which Socrates is wise. 
 
Roughly, the form of empirical knowledge is: an I thinking (however schematically) the 
thought of a temporal system of states of affairs to which any actual state of affairs belongs.  
(‘I’ §9; italics added) 
 
In Kant, the correlative “synthetic unity of apperception” roughly takes the form of an “I thinking 
a complex spatial-temporal-causal system of states of affairs…” (‘I’ §10) within which any 
particular perceived state of affairs must be lawfully integrated in general. 
 
 My understanding of Sellars is that he takes these Kantian claims to be defensible in general 
across both the manifest and scientific images of ‘man-in-the-world’, albeit as appropriately 
modified to reflect the later ‘linguistic turn’ or ‘new way of words’ in philosophy.  In fact this is 
the key to his own “synoptic vision” of the stereoscopic unity of those two idealized images, in 
which the manifest image conception of persons as thinking and intending beings is supposed to 
be preserved rather than “overwhelmed” (PSIM II ¶23, ISR 377, SPR 8–9).  Importantly for my 
present purposes, much of the remainder of Sellars’s ‘This I...’ article in fact contains some subtle 
suggestions, building on Kant’s analysis in the ‘Paralogisms’ chapter of the Critique of Pure Reason, 
as to how those Kantian truths can and should be modified in such a way as to accommodate a 
broadly Strawsonian or manifest image conception of knowable embodied persons that Kant 
himself officially rejects (for various reasons that Sellars explores), and which would be consistent 
with a naturalistic ontology at least in the following way: 
 
(1) that the empirical self – the I which we experience as thinking in time – is an aspect of 
a perceptible object which, as having physical attributes, is a body (i.e. that the logical 
subject which, as representing and capable of representing, is a being which thinks is 
identical with the being which, as having material attributes, is the body); 
 
(2) that the empirical I which, in so far forth as it is represented as thinking, is not 
represented as composite, is nevertheless identical with (i.e. is) a composite physical object.  
(‘I’ §30) 
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 For what Sellars endorses from Kant’s analysis in the Paralogisms is that a unitary “logical 
subject” of thoughts “which is not represented as an aspect of something more basic” or “as 
composite” nevertheless “may be an aspect of something more basic” or “be composite” (‘I’ §31).  
It is important to note that for Sellars the sense of “more basic” here would not require us “to say 
that my knowledge of myself as logically identical through the period of time in question is an 
illusion, but only that the logical identity of the I as I represent it, is not an adequate conceptualization 
of ‘the nature of our thinking being’ ” (‘I’ §28).  That is, the more “adequate conceptualization” of 
the nature of our thinking being, pace Kant (Sellars argues), can and should add to that formal or 
transcendental knowledge of the self the further knowledge that is contained in passages (1) and 
(2) above (‘I’ §30).  The upshot is that Sellars has here attempted to defend the conceptual 
irreducibility and “logical identity” of the thinking self in a way that is compatible with a 
thoroughgoing naturalistic ontology of the self, and that this is the case, according to Sellars’s own 
reckoning, whether the self is realized in the conceptual capacities of a manifest perceptible 
material substance or, as on Sellars’s own ultimate object-ontology, in what is ultimately “a bundle 
of absolute processes” (FMPP III, §125).  This striking Kantian naturalist outlook animated from 
start to finish Sellars’s philosophical vision of ‘how things hang together’ – and in particular, how 
normativity, personhood, conceptual thinking, and knowledge are preserved – across the manifest 
and scientific images, as is illustrated by the following remark on Kant from Sellars’s posthumously 
published Notre Dame lectures:  “When I talk about the in principle replaceability of the manifest 
image by the scientific image, I do so with respect to the content of the world, its material and not 
with respect to those forms which concern the normative, the obligatory, the correct, the incorrect, 
the valuable . . . . I think Kant is essentially right, not only in many of the things he said in a theory 
of knowledge but also in ethics” (WSNDL, pp. 223–4).  Or more particularly as Sellars summed 
up his Kantian naturalist conception of persons in his ‘Phenomenalism’ article: 
 
The heart of the matter is the fact that the irreducibility of the ‘I’ within the framework of 
first person discourse . . . is compatible with the thesis that persons can (in principle) be 
exhaustively described in terms which involve no reference to such an irreducible subject.  
For the description will mention rather than use the framework to which these logical 
subjects belong.  Kant saw that the transcendental unity of apperception is a form of 
experience rather than a disclosure of ultimate reality.  If persons are ‘really’ multiplicities 
of logical subjects, then unless these multiplicities used the conceptual framework of 
persons there would be no persons.  But the idea that persons ‘really are’ such multiplicities 
does not require that concepts pertaining to persons be analysable into concepts pertaining 
to sets of logical subjects.  Persons may ‘really be’ bundles, but the concept of a person is 
not the concept of a bundle. (PHM III, ¶45, 101) 
 
 Obviously the above account has only scratched the surface of what I have been suggesting 
is Sellars’s Kantian naturalist view of the nature of the thinking self together with the correlative 
Kantian conception of an “epistemic principle” that is supposed to encapsulate the necessarily 
holistic and systematic structure within which any particular item of knowledge must find its place.  
(For further exploration, I recommend Jay Rosenberg’s unjustly neglected Kantian and Sellarsian 
book, The Thinking Self (1986), recently reissued by Ridgeview.)  Sellars held that Kant justified his 
synthetic a priori (meta-) principles by embedding them within what is ultimately an analysis of the 
conceptually necessary conditions on any conceptual representation of temporal states-of-affairs 
in a world (cf. KTE §§10–11).  In what follows I will argue that for Sellars the above Kantian 
naturalist framework also provided the basis for his own more detailed accounts, extending 
throughout his career, of the epistemic principles that he contends are necessary for the possibility of 
our knowledge of objective states of affairs – or more basically, for the possibility of our having 
any empirically contentful thought about objective states of affairs in the first place. 
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4.  Sellars on Perceptual Knowledge and Epistemic Principles 
 
 
 Let us consider as our specimen for further examination Sellars’s account of human 
perceptual knowledge.  As briefly noted in the Introduction to this volume, at a minimum, and 
assuming familiarity with Sellars’s dot-quotation device (the dot quotes, roughly speaking, indicate 
normative-functional conceptual role or ‘use’ classifications), a typical adult, human visual 
perception of a red physical object, for Sellars, is contituted by: 
 
(a) a conceptually contentful, rule-governed response [roughly, an •x is red• thought], 
 
(b) normally caused by the appropriate corresponding object [i.e., by red objects], and 
 
(c) causally (not epistemically) mediated by nonconceptual sensings [sensing red-ly]. 
 
The conceptual component in (a), on Sellars’s account, entails that the perceptual knower must 
possess whatever conceptual capacities are necessary for one’s thoughts and responses to have a 
place “in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says” (EPM 
VIII, §36).  We shall see that just what this requirement entails is a matter of controversy.  The 
causal dimension in (b), on Sellars’s view, amounts to a normatively constituted and constrained 
reliability condition on perceptual knowledge.  Paradigmatically, in the case of adult human 
conceptual responses, the relevant norms that generate the reliability required of our perceptual 
knowings, on Sellars’s view, derive from the ‘ought-to-be’s and correlative ‘ought-to-do’s that 
characterize our initiation into a living natural language: roughly put, it ought-to-be that children’s 
responses (for example, ‘That’s red’) and inferences (‘So it’s not green’) come to reflect the norm-
governed patterns of thought and behavior that constitute the relevant conceptual roles (open-
textured and context dependent as they may be) within a given ‘space of reasons’.  Sellars holds 
compatibly with the above account of our reliable conceptualized perceptual responses – or so I 
and others have argued6  – that we also possess along with other animals more basic natural 
perceptual and active capacities the reliability of which is explainable in terms of inherited norms 
of functional adaptation that derive from our historical evolution by natural selection (see Sellars’s 
MEV in particular, on “animal representational systems”).  Our natural embedding within the latter 
biological patterns of normal functioning then partly accounts for the role in (c) of nonconceptual 
sensings in our perceptual knowings, the postulation of which is also required, Sellars argues, to 
explain the patterns of our conceptual responses in both veridical and non-veridical perceptual 
experiences (see, e.g., SM I, §44). 
 
 The distinctiveness of Sellars’s subtly integrated Kantian and yet naturalist account of our 
sense-perceptual knowledge should be evident from the above sketch.  In the other writings 
mentioned in the previous footnote I have been concerned to argue that Sellars’s integration of a 
richly explanatory theory of nonconceptual sensings in (c) is not only compatible with his 
normative ‘space of reasons’ analysis of perceptual accountability in (a) (about which more below), 
but has much to recommend it as a cognitive-scientific empirical hypothesis worthy of further 
exploration.  My particular concerns in what follows will be at the ‘top level’ of (a), so to speak, 
i.e., concerning Sellars’s Kantian account of the source of justification for our reflectively 
responsible perceptual knowings.  For Sellars’s particular ‘top-level’ Kantian analysis of the 
necessary structure of our empirical knowledge  has itself turned out to be as controversial among 
 
6 See, for example, Millikan, chapter 6 of this volume; O’Shea 2012b, 2010, and 2007 chapter 5; Rosenberg 
1986, chapters 4–7; and Seibt, chapter 9 of this volume 
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otherwise admiring Sellarsians as Sellars’s ‘bottom-level’ attempt to embed a naturalistic theory of 
nonconceptual sensory representation within that conceptual analysis. 
 
 What view of knowledge did Sellars take to be embodied in the account of perception 
sketched above?  The conceptual capacities and reasoning abilities in (a) of course reflect 
requirements on non-inferential knowledge that follow from Sellars’s famous rejection of the myth 
of the given in EPM, the success of which I will presuppose here (cf. O’Shea 2007, chapter 5).  Just 
what those requirements are, however, is a difficult and controversial matter on which Sellars 
continued to reflect in the decades following EPM, as we shall see.  But on his view such 
requirements certainly require conceptual abilities sufficient for one’s perceptual response to be a 
normative standing “in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one 
says.”   It is also clear that on Sellars’s view my perception of a red table in front of me is ‘direct’ 
or ‘immediate’ in at least two senses: first, due to the conceptualization involved in (a), the 
intentional object of my perceptual awareness is in this case the red physical object itself, not any 
postulated nonconceptual sensory representations as are involved in (c); and second, in being an 
object-evoked response as in (b) rather than the thought-evoked conclusion of an inference, the 
perceptual knowing is ‘direct’ or non-inferential in (at least) the sense of being evoked by its object 
rather than being inferred from another thought.  So Sellars wants to defend a conception of our 
perceptual knowings that captures both their epistemic status as adequately justified and yet also 
their non-inferential directness or ‘givenness’, and to do so without falling back on the Myth of 
the Given. 
 
 In EPM in 1956 Sellars’s basic proposal was that a perceiver S’s belief that a given object 
is green, for example, is justified (or is a case of observational knowledge) only if (1) S’s belief is 
the manifestation of a (reliable) tendency to form such beliefs, given a certain set, “if and only if a 
green object is being looked at in standard conditions” (EPM VIII §35).  But secondly, in addition 
to S’s perceptual belief thus being in fact an extremely highly reliable indicator of the corresponding 
perceptible state of affairs, and thus possessing epistemic credibility or authority insofar as one can 
reliably infer the truth of the belief from the fact that S forms it (in normal circumstances), Sellars 
also added the reflective condition that (2) “this authority must in some sense be recognized by the 
person whose report it is” (ibid.).7  Thus S in some sense has “to know that” her beliefs “of this 
kind are reliable indicators of the existence, suitably related to” her, “of green objects” (EPM VIII 
§36).  In particular, knowledge on Sellars’s account requires that one be able, if called upon, to take 
responsibility for one’s reliability, to be able to say something in support of one’s assertional 
commitment if questions arise about the circumstances.  In fact it was precisely in the context of 
the two paragraphs in EPM in which Sellars added this further reflective requirement on perceptual 
knowledge that Sellars made his now famous statement that “in characterizing an episode or state 
as that of knowing . . . we are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able 
to justify what one says” (ibid.). 
 
 It is a direct consequence of this view that S must “in some sense” have knowledge of her 
own general reliability (in relation to cases of the relevant sort) if she is to have any particular perceptual 
knowledge whatsoever.  Sellars trumpets this consequence as yet another reason to reject the sort 
of epistemic atomism that characterizes traditional foundationalist empiricism and the myth of the 
given (cf. EPM §32).  The myth, in this respect, is that one could have knowledge of particular 
matters of fact in the absence of knowledge of certain general matters of fact – in this case the 
knowledge, “in some sense,” of one’s own general perceptual reliability in this kind of 
circumstance.  But this virtue of the Sellarsian account also threatens to be its Achilles heel.  For 
 
7 For insightful stress on the importance of reflexivity requirements throughout Sellars’s philosophy, and on 
how this reflects insights of the German Idealist tradition from Kant to Hegel, see deVries 2005 and 2009. 
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as Sellars recognized, this requirement immediately leads to the familiar challenge, on pain either 
of regress (EPM §§36–7) or of circularity (“More on Givenness and Explanatory Coherence,” 
MGEC §§59–61), to explain how it is that we are supposed to have knowledge of the relevant 
general epistemic principles or general matters of fact without relying on any knowledge of 
particular matters of fact (since the latter knowledge, ex hypothesi, is possible only if we already have 
a grip on the relevant general knowledge).  Sellars addressed and re-addressed this difficulty across 
multiple writings throughout his career. 
 
 Sellars’s continuing aim was to conceive how both of those dimensions of dependency can 
simultaneously be in play without this conception leading to implausibilities in either direction: 
neither resorting to conceiving direct perceptual knowledge in a way that threatens to reintroduce 
‘givenness’ in any objectionable sense, nor demanding reflective inferential justification in a way 
that threatens to rob perceptual knowledge of such non-inferential warrant, in some sense, as it 
does seem to possess.  That is, supposing that we have now rejected the myth of the given and 
have embraced both external reliability and reflective reason-giving as necessary for perceptual 
knowledge, this Sellarsian outlook needs to clarify how it is that our perceptual observations on 
the one hand are able to function as the sort of warranted non-inferential ‘input’ knowledge upon 
which our more general knowledge ordinarily depends, while on the other hand such items of 
knowledge are argued to be essentially dependent for their warranted status on a space of inferential 
patterns of justificatory reasoning that is “in some sense” already grasped by the perceiver.   
 
 In EPM Part VIII Sellars originally posed the problem in terms of a regress worry 
concerning knowledge acquisition.  As we just saw, Sellars claims that S can perceptually know the 
particular fact that P only if S already knows some general fact about her reliability.  The objection 
Sellars considers is that surely S’s knowledge of her general reliability in that domain would have 
to be based upon at least some prior instances of S’s having particular knowledge of facts in that 
domain.  Sellars’s response in EPM to what he called this “steep hurdle” (§35) was to argue that 
the general knowledge of one’s reliability that must be possessed by any responsible adult knower 
S can be based inductively on her present (non-inferential) memory of past facts (i.e., “Jones’s ability 
to give inductive reasons today” (§37)) concerning her having been trained into such reliable 
patterns of belief formation at a time when she was not then able to take reflective responsibility for 
her own general reliability:  “And the regress disappears,” Sellars concludes (EPM §37, including 
the footnote added in SPR in 1963).  Sellars’s sketchy idea here seems to be that we thus do not 
need to appeal to any mythically original instances of ‘particular-without-general-knowledge’ on 
S’s part in order to understand how it is that her possession of any instance of particular knowledge 
does indeed require that she possess responsible general knowledge of her own reliability.  She 
grew and was trained into her eventual possession of a sufficiently responsible grip on her own 
reliability through the social acquisition of the appropriate norm-guided habits of conceptual-
linguistic response to objects and situations in appropriate circumstances.   
 
 The conclusion for Sellars in EPM was that the structure of reflectively responsible, reliable 
knowledge successfully exhibits both directions of dependency discussed above, an account which 
he famously summed up this way:8    
 
There is clearly some point to the picture of human knowledge as resting on a level of 
propositions – observation reports – which do not rest on other propositions in the same 
way as other propositions rest on them.  On the other hand, I do wish to insist that the 
 
8 John McDowell has stressed these two dimensions as central to what he appropriately characterizes as 
“Sellars’s Transcendental Empiricism” (1999). 
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metaphor of ‘foundation’ is misleading in that it keeps us from seeing that if there is a 
logical dimension in which other empirical propositions rest on observation reports, there 
is another logical dimension in which the latter rest on the former. 
 Above all, the picture is misleading because of its static character.  One seems forced 
to choose between the picture of an elephant which rests on a tortoise (What supports the 
tortoise?) and the picture of a great Hegelian serpent of knowledge with its tail in its mouth 
(Where does it begin?).  Neither will do.  For empirical knowledge, like its sophisticated 
extension, science, is rational, not because it has a foundation but because it is a self-
correcting enterprise which can put any claim in jeopardy, though not all at once.9  (EPM 
VIII §38) 
 
 This is essentially where Sellars left his account of the structure of our knowledge in EPM.  
However, it is clear from his subsequent writings that while he regarded the above conclusion to 
be sound in general, he also considered his own quasi-inductive response to the steep regress 
hurdle in EPM to be problematic.   
 
 In the third lecture of ‘The Structure of Knowledge’, entitled ‘Epistemic Principles’, Sellars 
argues (SK III, §33) that “the justification involved in [such] ‘non-inferential’ knowledge” as when 
“Jones sees there to be a red apple in front of him” – provided that Jones has acquired a competent 
grip on the relevant concepts involved10 – consists in the fact that Jones is (if called upon) “justified 
in reasoning”:  I had the perceptual experience ‘Here is a red apple’ in normal circumstances (or as Sellars puts 
it, “no countervailing conditions obtain”); “So, there is good reason to believe that there is a red apple in 
front of me” (SK III, §33; italics added).   Sellars comments: 
 
Of course, the conclusion of this reasoning is not the thinking involved in his original 
perceptual experience.  Like all justification arguments, it is a higher-order thinking.  He 
did not originally infer that there is a red apple in front of him.  Now, however, he is 
inferring from the character and context of his experience that it is veridical and that there 
is good reason to believe that there is indeed a red apple in front of him.  
 Notice that although the justification of the belief that there is a red apple in front 
of (Jones) is an inferential justification, it has the peculiar character that its essential premise 
asserts the occurrence of the very same belief in a specific context.  It is this fact which 
gives the appearance that such beliefs are self-justifying and hence gives the justification the 
appearance of being non-inferential.  (SK III, §§34–35) 
 
Sellars goes on to suggest that it is the latter misleading appearance that helps to explain the deep 
error of ‘givennist’ foundationalists such as Roderick Chisholm and all those who contend that in 
perception it is the fact that-p that directly justifies one’s non-inferential perceptual belief that-p.  Or 
as Chisholm puts it (1966: 28, quoted by Sellars): “What justifies me in counting it as evident that 
a is F is simply the fact that a is F.”  On Sellars’s view above, by contrast, the justification takes 
the form (in light of the available reasoning above):  “If I ostensibly see there to be an F object 
here, then it is highly reasonable for me (to believe) that there is an F object here” (SK III, §42).11 
 
9 For an insightful pragmatist stress on the importance of the diachronic second paragraph in this passage, 
see Michael Williams 2009. 
 
10 As usual Sellars states all of this in terms of his “verbal behaviorist” (VB) linguistic model, but here I will 
assume the success of Sellars’s ‘myth of Jones’ postulation of corresponding ‘inner thought episodes’ in 
EPM XV–XVI and SK I–II, and thus state matters in terms of thoughts and beliefs when convenient. 
 
11 Sellars’s discussion of Chisholm at SK III, §§36–42 is complicated by the fact that Chisholm’s own 
principles, which Sellars here goes on to examine critically, are formulated in terms of Chisholm’s view that 
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 In a footnote to the passage quoted above (SK III, §35) Sellars refers this “feature of the 
justification involved in ‘non-inferential’ knowledge” back to his earlier view in ‘Phenomenalism’ 
(PHM), written three years after EPM, that (and here he quotes himself) “to say that one directly 
knows that-p is to say that his right to the conviction that-p essentially involves the fact that the 
idea that-p occurred to the knower in a specific way” (PHM V, ¶66, 88).  He notes that in PHM 
he had called this “trans-level credibility,” as involving a “trans-level inference” (cf. Jones’s 
available higher-order thought and inference discussed above), and adds: “A similar point was less 
clearly made in Sections §§32–39 of [EPM].”  We have seen that the corresponding argument for 
a similar conclusion in EPM was made to turn on Jones’s present ability to reason inductively about 
the fledgling nature of his past (originally unknowing) acquisition of the relevant conceptual 
abilities involved in being able to have the perceptual thought, ‘Here is a red apple’ (EPM §37).  
Sellars’s later epistemological writings such as SK and MGEC make clear, I suggest, that he came 
to regard as insufficient EPM’s implausible appeal to “Jones’s inductive reasons” as a response to 
the “steep hurdle” of having to account for Jones’s non-circular knowledge of his general 
perceptual reliability, and thus for our knowledge of epistemic principles more generally.  We shall 
also see that EPM §38’s important appeal to the “non-static” or diachronic character of “empirical 
knowledge” (or science) as a “self-correcting enterprise” is also regarded by Sellars as insufficient 
for clearing the steep hurdle of satisfactorily accounting for the nature of our non-circular, implicit 
knowledge of general epistemic principles.  My contention is that Sellars’s evolving solution to this 
problem involved clarifying more explicitly key aspects of his two-pronged Kantian naturalist 
approach both in its Kantian and in its scientific naturalist or broadly inductive explanatory 
dimensions.   
 In both SK and MGEC Sellars once again stressed the ‘steep hurdle’ in the form of a 
vicious circularity that threatens to obtain between our warranted general epistemic principles and 
the particular non-inferential perceptions they are supposed to warrant.  In these articles, however, 
Sellars argues explicitly that it is a mistake to think that the problem can be dissolved on inductive 
or explanatory grounds concerning our original social acquisition of the relevant conceptual-
linguistic abilities.  It is true that at SK III, §43 Sellars rejects Chisholm’s account of epistemic 
principles as “a justification of the ‘this or nothing’ kind familiar to the Kantian tradition,” perhaps 
also as involving dubious appeals to self-evident synthetic a priori principles; and that Sellars then 
contrasts that with his own account, according to which “these epistemic principles can be placed 
in a naturalistic setting and their authority construed in terms of the nature of concept formation 
and of the acquisition of relevant linguistic skills” (SK III, §44). However, Sellars immediately 
clarifies these remarks in a way that highlights both the nature of his own Kantian conceptual 
analysis (as opposed to Chisholm’s and the Kantian tradition’s alleged ‘this or nothing’ appeal to 
self-evident synthetic principles), and thereby also displays the kind of non-empirical source of 
justification for epistemic principles that he thinks is required in order successfully to dispose of 
the threatening circle: 
 
But surely, it will be urged, facts about learning languages and acquiring linguistic skills are 
themselves empirical facts; and to know these facts involves perception, memory, indeed 
all the epistemic activities the justification of which is at stake.  Must we not conclude that 
any such account as I give of the principle that perceptual beliefs occurring in perceptual 
contexts are likely to be true is circular?  It must indeed be granted that principles pertaining 
to the epistemic authority of perceptual and memory beliefs are not the sort of thing which 
could be arrived at by inductive reasoning from perceptual belief.  But the best way to make 
 
what is first and foremost ‘directly evident’ to us are appearances rather than, as on Sellars’s own view of 
perceptual knowledge, physical states of affairs themselves.  But what emerges from Sellars’s discussion is 
what I have indicated in the text. 
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this point is positive.  We have to be in this framework to be thinking and perceiving beings at all.  [. 
. .]  But surely this makes it clear that the exploration of these principles is but part and 
parcel of the task of explicating the concept of a rational animal or, in VB [verbal 
behaviorist] terms, of a language-using organism whose language is about the world in 
which it is used.  It is only in light of this larger task that the problem of the status of 
epistemic principles reveals its true meaning. (SK III, §§46–7) 
 
 What these passages from SK §§45–7 imply is that there are two sorts of answer to be given 
to questions concerning the justification of epistemic principles.  One is that the authority of 
epistemic principles (such as “the principle that perceptual beliefs occurring in perceptual contexts 
are likely to be true”) is indeed to be explained by placing them “in a naturalistic setting” of concept 
acquisition that accounts for why it is true – that is, how it has come to be so – that our perceptual 
thoughts in favorable circumstances are highly likely to be true.  But that sort of theoretical or 
broadly inductive explanation of the reliability of our most basic conceptual capacities, crucial and 
indispensable as that explanation is, will indeed inevitably rely on data and hypotheses the warrant 
for which presupposes the general reliability of those same conceptual capacities.  What Sellars 
takes the modified Kantian conceptual analyses to show, in addition to this, is that an independent 
source of warrant that is also possessed by the same set of reliable conceptual capacities – capacities 
which the scientific explanatory perspective thus aims to show we can intelligibly be seen to come 
to possess within ‘a naturalistic setting’ – derives from the Kantian insight that the resulting 
“framework” of reliable conceptual capacities can be shown, as Kant aimed to show, to be “general 
features any conceptual system must have in order to generate knowledge of a world to which it 
belongs” (KTE IX, §41).  After suggesting this more adequate Kantian naturalist account of the 
justification of epistemic principles, Sellars then concludes SK with the two paragraphs from EPM 
§38 that were quoted above. 
 
 Strong confirmation of the above interpretation of Sellars’s two-source account in SK of 
the warrant for general epistemic principles – that is, as based on a Kantian-style conceptual 
analysis and as underwritten by an intelligible sketch of, and ongoing search for, an adequate 
naturalistic explanation – is then provided by the fact that this is exactly what Sellars went on to 
propose in more detail in 1979 in his densely argued article, “More on Givenness and Explanatory 
Coherence” (or so, at any rate, I have contended elsewhere in relation to MGEC).12  In this late 
article Sellars proposes that the justification for the epistemic principles that display the warrant 
possessed by our particular non-inferential “IPM” judgments (i.e., our introspective, perceptual, 
and memory judgments) consists in their “belonging to a theory of persons as representers of 
themselves-in-the-world, which, although it has good explanatory power and is capable of 
refinement by inductive procedures, was not (and, indeed, could not have been) arrived at by 
inferences guided by inductive canons however broadly construed” (MGEC §40).  It turns out by 
the end of MGEC that such a ‘Theory T’, as Sellars calls it, would have to encompass two different 
kinds of explanation at once.   
 
 
12 In O’Shea 2011: 347–54, I offered a detailed reading of MGEC along these lines in response to William 
A. Rottschaefer’s 2011 ‘right wing Sellarsian’ attempt to defend the sufficiency in principle of scientific 
explanation in Sellars’s overall theory of knowledge, in contrast to my claims concerning the irreducibly 
Kantian aspects of Sellars’s epistemology from start to finish.   For another important critical exchange that 
explores Sellars’s epistemology through to its later formulation in MGEC and other writings, see Michael 
Williams and Ernest Sosa in The Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume LXXVII 2003, ‘Are There Two 
Grades of Knowledge?’, in particular Williams’s ‘Mythology of the Given: Sosa, Sellars and the Task of 
Epistemology’.  Williams’s own view on this matter is further developed in his 2009. 
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 For once again, he argues, what is needed in order to understand the justification that is 
possessed by the epistemic meta-principles is not only a well-confirmed empirical explanation of 
how, both as individuals and as a species, we could have come to possess the highly reliable 
conceptual capacities that are expressed in those principles.  To avoid circularity, he argues, there 
must also be “a way in which it could be independently reasonable to accept” such principles “in 
spite of the fact that a ground for accepting” them “is the fact that they belong to T, which we 
suppose to be an empirically well-confirmed theory.”  That is, we “must carefully distinguish 
between having good reason to accept” such epistemic meta-principles as that, for example, our 
perceptual responses are highly likely to be true, “and having good reason to accept a proposed 
explanation of why” our perceptual responses are highly likely to be true (MGEC §84).  Or more 
generally: “Clearly we must distinguish the question ‘How did we get into the framework?’ from 
the question ‘Granted that we are in the framework, how can we justify accepting it?’  In neither 
case, however, is the answer ‘by inductive reasoning’ appropriate” (MGEC §78).  In relation to the 
first question, Sellars suggests that  
 
[p]resumably the question ‘How did we get into the framework?’ has a causal answer, a 
special application of evolutionary theory to the emergence of beings capable of 
conceptually representing the world of which they have come to be a part. (MGEC §79). 
 
The answer to the second question, however, “lies in the necessary connection between being in 
the framework of epistemic evaluation” at all – that is, in the conceptual framework that is 
characterized by the possession of the reliable conceptual capacities expressed in the epistemic 
meta-principles – “and being agents” (MGEC §80): for philosophical analysis can show that “the 
concept of effective agency involves that of our IPM [e.g., perceptual] judgments being likely to 
be true, that is, to be correct mappings of ourselves and our circumstances” (MGEC §82).  The 
necessary conceptual connections adverted to in these last passages, properly understood in the 
context of MGEC §§66–89, is that it is “reasonable to accept” the epistemic meta-principles 
because “they are elements in a conceptual framework which defines what it is to be a finite knower 
in a world one never made” (MGEC §73).  The upshot, Sellars concludes, is that the general 
perceptual reliability principle “is epistemically prior to the reasonableness of particular IPM [e.g. 
perceptual] judgments, whereas particular IPM judgments are epistemically prior to explanations of 
the likely truth of IPM judgments” (MGEC §86).   
 
  On Sellars’s account of non-inferential perceptual knowledge, then, the warrant possessed 
by our direct perceptions depends on the de facto (though norm-parasitic) reliability of such 
conceptual responses together with the standing ability of the perceiver, if called upon, to reflect 
on the context as one in which “no countervailing conditions obtain”.  The latter available 
inference presupposes warrant for the general principle that our perceptual responses in normal 
circumstances are highly likely to be true, and on Sellars’s view the philosophical justification for 
such epistemic principles has two sides.   First, it can be shown that such epistemic principles must 
characterize any conceptual framework that enables the cognition of objective states of affairs as 
such (Sellars’s modified Kantian analysis); and second, evolutionary and social-developmental 
explanations put forward “in a naturalistic setting” must be available in principle to account for 
how and why our conceptual capacities have in fact come to be highly reliable in this way.   
 
 This is a defensible account of the structure of our empirical knowledge in general, and of 
the warrant for our non-inferential perceptual responses in particular.  It also exhibits in one 
striking way Sellars’s youthful and enduring sense that Kant’s conceptual analyses will, with 
appropriate modifications, remain true in both the theoretical and practical domains, and this 
within an exhaustively scientific naturalist ontology.    It is a remarkable and uniquely Kantian 
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naturalist vision, although its influence has so far been felt more in each of its two distinguishable 
aspects, ‘Kantian – or scientific naturalist?’, than in its intended combined ambition.   
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